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United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo: Irregularities in the procurement for the extension of the Cargo Apron at Pristina Airport (Case No. 0282-04), 1 Jan 2005

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Release date
January 12, 2009

Summary

United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (UN OIOS) 1 Jan 2005 report titled "Irregularities in the procurement for the extension of the Cargo Apron at Pristina Airport [Case No. 0282-04]" relating to the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. The report runs to 7 printed pages.

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Verified by Sunshine Press editorial board

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Further information

Context
International organization
United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services
Authored on
January 1, 2005
File size in bytes
154850
File type information
PDF
Cryptographic identity
SHA256 01f845cc2177ad71ab14d09d3bde3fb67b09571542987c8b496e12963a56a2aa


Simple text version follows

           UNITED NATIONS                             NATIONS UNIES
               United Nations Interim                 Mission d'Administration Int�rimaire
     Administration Mission in Kosovo                 des Nations Unies au Kosovo
                                          UNMIK
                            Investigation Task Force

             Irregularities in the procurement for the extension of the
                  Cargo Apron at Pristina Airport (Case 0282/04)


                                        I. INTRODUCTION

1. This case arises out of an audit report dated 28 February 2003 into the financial
   statements of Pristina International Airport conducted by the Chartered
   Accountants, which led to an investigation concerning alleged corruption and
   irregularities arising in the course of procurements and contracts at Pristina
   International Airport.

2. There are four specific allegations in this report of investigation:
   � tender specifications produced by the Pristina Airport for the cargo apron
      extension were insufficiently specific and without clear instructions for bidder
      contrary to UNMIK Finance Regulation 1999/2;
   � three persons on the bid opening committee were also part of the technical
      evaluation committee contrary to procurement regulations;
   � the contract for the cargo apron extension was not provided to the UNMIK
      Office of the Legal Adviser for clearance; and
   � it is alleged that the Vendor was allowed to certify its work as per the
      requirements of the contract.


           II. APPLICABLE TERRITORIAL LAWS AND UNITED NATIONS
                             PROCEDURAL RULES

Section 1 of UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 dated 12 December 1999 as amended,
states that the law applicable in Kosovo shall be:
       a) "The regulations promulgated by the Special Representative of the
           Secretary General (SRSG) and subsidiary instruments issued pursuant to
           those regulations; and
       b) The Law in force in Kosovo on 22 March 1989."

UN Staff Regulations 1.2 (b) stipulates, "Staff members shall uphold the highest
standards of efficiency, competence and integrity"

UNMIK Finance Administrative Instruction 1999/2 on Public Procurement using
Kosovo Consolidated Budget Funds provides that:
  Article 4 1 � "Competition among and participation in the procurement process
  shall be maximised."


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                           2


   Article 4.1.1 � "All Suppliers and Contractors and their tenders shall be treated
   fairly, equally, and non-discriminatorily, without favouritism or prejudice and each
   Tender shall be judged on its merits."
   Article 4.3.3. � "If a consultant or any principal, officer or employee of such
   consultant has participated or will participate in any manner in the preparation of
   the UNMIK Kosovo Interim Administration's Tendering for a contract, including
   but not limited to preparations of specifications or any other Tender Documents,
   no such consultant nor any principal officer or employee of such consultant, no
   "related person" nor any "illegal payer" may tender for or sponsor or participate in
   the Tendering for such contract."
   Article 23.3 � "All tender documents shall contain complete information in neutral
   and objective terms so that there can be full and fair competition among all
   suppliers. In particular Tender Documents must include the advertisement and .."
   Article 23.3.4 � "...full technical specifications, including the time limits for
   delivery and completion."

Staff Rule 110.1: Misconduct. "Failure by a staff member to comply with his or her
obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, the Staff Regulations and the
Staff Rules or other relevant administrative issuances, or to observe the standards of
conduct expected of an international civil servant, may amount to unsatisfactory
conduct within the meaning of staff regulation 10.2, leading to the institution of
disciplinary measures for misconduct."

                                  III. METHODOLOGY

3. This investigation was conducted pursuant to Executive Decision No 2003/16 on
   the establishment of the Investigation Task Force. The ITF investigators
   conducted an enquiry into the allegations raised by interviews with persons
   indicated to be witnesses and persons potentially implicated in the allegations; by
   obtaining documents from the Pristina Airport administration and from Pillar IV,
   which were then analysed for relevance to the inquiry at hand.

                         IV. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

4. Pristina International Airport constitutes a state owned enterprise under
   Yugoslavian law. The assets of the airport include the runways, terminal
   buildings, hanger, fuel storage facilities and equipment. During the period
   covered by this investigation, from 2001 until 2003, they were maintained by the
   Public Enterprise Airport Pristina, (PEAP) in cooperation with Military Units of the
   Kosovo Force (KFOR). Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution
   1244 dated 10 June 1999, and UNMIK Regulation No 1/1999 dated 25 July 1999.
   UNMIK is mandated to administer the territory of Kosovo, including state owned
   and publicly owned assets. This includes Pristina International Airport.

5. Until the end of June 2002, responsibility for the administration of the Pristina
   Airport was entrusted to the Civil Administration Pillar (Pillar II) of UNMIK,
   including Official 1 and Official 2. Pillar II supervised DOTI Official 1 (Department
   of Transport and Infrastructure). The DOTI was later known as the Transport
   Sector of the UNMIK Directorate of Infrastructure Affairs. DOTI Official 1 left
   UNMIK at the end of June 2002. DOTI Official 2 was recruited by the DOTI as an
   international staff member on 31 July 2000 in charge of airport operations,


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                            3


   reporting to DOTI Official 1, and continued in this role until 30 September 2001.
   Engineering expertise was provided by a series of engineers seconded from the
   armed forces of a United Nations member state, specifically Airport Engineer 1,
   Airport Engineer 2, and Airport Engineer 3, and later by a consultant from the
   Consulting Company.

6. On 1 July 2002, the responsibility for the administration of the Airport passed
   from Pillar II to the Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA) and Pillar IV. The Divisional
   Manager was appointed. Under him were the PEAP Official and ATCS Official
   (Air Traffic Control Services).

7. On 1 April 2004 Pristina International Airport, which had until that time been
   under the jurisdiction of KFOR was handed over to civilian jurisdiction, under
   ICAO regulations.

8. It is against this background of change that procurement procedures relating to
   the following contract have been examined.


                             V. INVESTIGATION DETAILS

9. This part of the investigation relates to a tender for a contract for the extension of
   the Cargo Terminal Apron at Pristina Airport. The value of the contract was
   774,318.63.
                                      Allegation 1

(Specifically, the tender documents for the cargo apron did not comply with the
requirements of Article 23.4 of the UNMIK Finance Administrative Instruction 1999/2
on Public Procurement using Kosovo Consolidated Budget Funds, as they were
based on summary documents and did not include clear instructions on drawings
and plans.)

10. A note from the Project Engineer at the Evaluation Company to the PEAP
    Official, dated 31 January 2001, indicates that the Evaluation Company was
    commissioned to produce a preliminary design for the Cargo Terminal at Pristina
    Airport. The design also provided for the construction of the Cargo Apron
    Extension.

11. A prequalification evaluation was held 5 April 2001 as a result of which five
    companies were pre-qualified to submit bids for the Cargo Apron Extension. Four
    companies submitted bids, and following an evaluation, the contract was
    awarded to the Vendor. A contract was signed for the Cargo Apron Extension on
    11 September 2001.

12. A letter from the Vendor to UNMIK and PEAP dated 9 May 2001 indicates that it
    submitted a bid for the Cargo Apron Extension. The tender documents include
    what appears to be a section from the preliminary design documents produced by
    the Evaluation Company. Specifically, it includes a section entitled "Bills of
    Quantities" from pages 17 and 18 of the Evaluation Company preliminary design
    documents.


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                            4


13. An interoffice memorandum providing an "outstanding issues update to Official
    2", from DOTI Official 3 to Staff member 1 at the office of Official 2 dated 18 May
    2001, could give rise to the suggestion that offers were provided by companies
    on 28 May 2001, and the Vendor had been chosen for the works in advance.
    However, a more likely explanation is the date of the interoffice memorandum
    has been incorrectly dated, since the document contains reference dates relating
    to project "events" which post date 18 May 2001. At paragraph 2b, the interoffice
    memorandum states that the Cargo Apron invitation to tender was based on
    summary documents.

14. At paragraph 4 of the Cargo Apron Extension evaluation report dated 2 August
    2001, the committee notes that the bidding documents did not include clear
    instructions on drawing and plans. It therefore was recommended that
    negotiations be held with the lowest bidder, the Vendor, on further details of the
    scope of works.

15. In combination, the two documents suggest that the tender documents did not
    comply with Article 23.3 of the UNMIK Finance Administrative Instruction 1999/2
    on Public Procurement using Kosovo Consolidated Budget Funds.

16. When asked whether he/she was of the view that the tender documents complied
    with the provisions of Article 23.3 of the UNMIK Finance Administrative
    Instruction 1999/2 on Public Procurement using Kosovo Consolidated Budget
    Funds, DOTI Official 2 conceded that if an engineer was asked this question,
    he/she would indicate that the tender specifications were technically deficient and
    did not comply with Article 23.3.

17. DOTI Official 2 explained that the technical details of the Cargo Apron extension
    project were taken from the cargo terminal study produced by the Evaluation
    Company and pasted into the tender document specifications. Thereafter, it was
    up to the company winning the tender to demonstrate that they could fulfil the
    specification.

18. According to DOTI Official 2, Airport Engineer 1, who arrived shortly after the
    tender had been launched, had been angry with the Evaluation Company for
    allowing DOTI Official 2 to send out excerpts of their study as the tender
    specifications. Airport Engineer 1 had also expressed concern at the method
    used for preparing the tender documents, as from an engineering point of view
    the tenders did not contain sufficient detail. However, DOTI Official 2 stated that if
    the Evaluation Company had been asked to prepare the tender documents, it
    would have cost more money. He/she had therefore prepared the tender
    documents himself/herself and sent them to a Procurement Official at the CPE to
    review and help him with the procurement exercise.

19. Assistance from the CPE was provided primarily by a CPE Procurement Officer,
    and to a lesser extent by the Procurement Official, as to the procurement
    documents and rules. However, DOTI Official 2 expressed the view that neither
    the Procurement Official nor the CPE Procurement Officer would have had the
    technical expertise or time to review the technical specifications.


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                                            5


20. DOTI Official 2 emphasised that there was no engineering expert to support
    his/her work at the time the tender was launched, a fact that made his/her work
    very difficult.

                                   Allegations 2 & 3

  (Specifically, three of the persons on the bid opening committee and evaluation
  committees were the same parties who should not have carried out both tasks.)

                                           and

 (The contract for the Cargo Apron Extension was not channelled through the Office
                               of the Legal Adviser.)


21. The evaluation report dated 2 August 2001 is signed by three parties, who are
    also listed as having attended the bid opening session. This indicates that the
    composition of the bid opening committee and the evaluation committee
    overlapped.

22. When asked about this issue in interview DOTI Official 2 confirmed that he/she
    was both on the bid opening committee and was a member of the evaluation
    committee. He/she added that the people who evaluated the offers signed the
    evaluation report. This is in conflict with UN regulations, which segregate the two
    roles. An interoffice memorandum dated 24 September 2001 indicates that the
    contract for the Cargo Apron Extension had not been channelled through the
    Office of the Legal Adviser.

                                      Allegation 4

(Specifically, that the Vendor produced its own test results to confirm the quality of its
            own work on the Cargo Apron, resulting in a conflict of interest.)

23. An interoffice memorandum from Staff member 2 to the Procurement Official,
    signed by DOTI Official 1 dated 18 October 2001, indicates that DOTI Official 1
    authorised the soil stabilisation work. The memorandum also adds that the work
    was inadvertently not included in the original contract.

24. DOTI Official 2 told the ITF that in order to progress the cargo apron tender,
    he/she had to organise a geographical survey. He/she added that only after the
    tests were done could the tender go ahead. However, the evaluation report at
    paragraph 4 suggests that information on the nature of the ground does not
    appear to have been included in the tender documents. In addition, a letter from
    the Vendor to UNMIK and PEAP dated 27 June 2001, but apparently not
    received at UNMIK and PEAP until 17 October 2001, according to a manuscript
    note signed by Airport Engineer 1 at the bottom of the letter, suggests that it
    carried out its own soil tests.

25. A letter from the Vendor to PEAP dated 18 September 2003 suggests that the
    Vendor also produced its own bearing capacity report for the Cargo Apron,
    thereby "self certifying" its own work. Whilst the tender documents at page 5,


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                                           6


   reference 11.4, provide for the Contractor to pay liquidated damages in the event
   that the "load-bearing " capacity of the apron is less than foreseen in the contract,
   upon completion of the work, the contract is silent as to whom should carry out
   the tests. However, it is questionable as to whether the Vendor should have
   carried it out, since it presents a conflict of interest.

26. When asked about this in interview, the Divisional Manager stated:
   "Without seeing any other documents, on the face of it, it does appear that there
   could be a conflict of interest here. But the report was produced by a professional
   pavement engineer, at a laboratory. Therefore, one can assume a certain degree
   of integrity."
27. The ITF notes that the PEAP Official indicated that he/she was unhappy about
   the Vendor self-certifying its work and he/she commented that the airport
   engineer should have questioned it.

28. The ITF does not have sufficient technical knowledge to assess the adequacy of
    the Vendor's work. However, a letter from the Divisional Manager to Staff
    Member 3 dated 25 August 2002 gives rise to the possibility that it was not up to
    specification in certain areas.

                                  VI. CONCLUSIONS

29. Evidence indicates that the tender documents for the cargo apron did not comply
    with the requirements of Article 23.4 of the UNMIK Finance Administrative
    Instruction 1999/2 on Public Procurement using Kosovo Consolidated Budget
    Funds, as they were based on summary documents and did not include clear
    instructions on drawings and plans. This appears to have been due to an attempt
    to cut costs in preparing the tender documents, as well as a lack of appropriately
    qualified staff.

30. In mitigation, the inadequacy of the tender documents also appears to have been
    due to ignorance as to the appropriate quantity of detail to be included in the
    tender documents rather than a deliberate act calculated to manipulate the tender
    process.

31. DOTI Official 2 is primarily responsible for the shortcomings in the tender
    documents although, DOTI Official 1 and the CPE must also bear a certain
    amount of responsibility.

32. The shortcomings in the tender documents are likely to have prejudiced some
    companies in their decision as to submitting bids for the tenders, since they may
    not have been clear as to the detailed requirements of the tender and therefore
    submitted insufficient detail in their bids as a result.

33. Three persons are indicated to have both attended the bid opening session as
    well as been on the tender evaluation committee, in conflict with UN regulations.

34. Evidence indicates the contract for the Cargo Apron Extension was not
    channelled through the Office of the Legal Adviser.


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                                           7


35. Evidence indicates that the Vendor produced its own bearing capacity report for
    the Cargo Apron, thereby "self certifying" its own work and presenting a potential
    conflict of interest.

                             VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

36. It is recommended that UNMIK ensure that all contracts are referred for legal
    advice before signature in order to reduce potential liability issues and avoid a
    recurrence of the problems of this instant case. (IV04/282/01)
37. It is recommended that UNMIK ensure that staff understand and comply with the
    requirements of the UNMIK Public Procurement Regulation No 2004/3.
    (IV04/282/02)
38. It is recommended that UNMIK ensures that all work conducted under contract, in
    which the final product has to be evaluated, that said the evaluation be carried
    out by a suitably qualified, independent entity. (IV04/282/03)

39. It is recommended that DPKO take appropriate action with respect to DOTI
    Official 2 (currently serving with MONUC). (IV04/282/04)


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